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1.
Introduction. Many philosophers of science agree that the reduction of one scientific theory to another requires "bridge laws": statements linking concepts of the reduced theory to concepts of the reducing theory. But there has been considerable controversy about the metaphysical status of these statements. Are they definitions, or identity statements, or ordinary correlation laws, or something else? I shall suggest in this paper that they are something else.
For simplicity of exposition, I shall assume that a scientific theory is ordinarily formulated in a first-order language whose only non-logical vocabulary is a stock of predicates. My discussion would be more complicated, but not fundamentally different, if this assumption were relaxed. Suppose then that theory T' is to be reduced to theory T, by means of a set of bridge laws B. It is widely agreed that an adequate reduction must satisfy at least the following conditions. held that bridge laws are true by fiat-i.e., that they have the status of theoretical/observational "coordinating definitions" or "correspondence rules," rather than the status of factual, material assertions. Nagel argues that bridge laws can be either factual statements or coordinating definitions, depending on the context in which the reduction is developed. Specifically, he claims that a bridge law B, might well be a coordinating definition if one of its component predicates (say Pi) has not been assigned a coordinating definition of its own prior to the reduction, and if the other component-predicate of Bi (i.e., Q,) is sufficiently "observational." But I believe that Carl Hempel is correct when he argues in [6] that the statements traditionally known as "coordinating definitions" or "correspondence rules" are not stipulative definitions at all, but substantive, factual assertions in their own right. Thus, even if bridge laws can sometimes be included among a theory's so-called "correspondence rules," they cannot properly be considered stipulative definitions. (I discuss Hempel's position in section 2 below.) Logic-texts often emphasize that an object-language statement which introduces a new expression into a theory will count as a proper definition only if it satisfies two formal criteria: eliminability and non-creativity.3 Admittedly, biconditional bridge laws of the form (Bi) do satisfy these criteria; indeed, their universally-quantified biconditional form is the paradigmatic form for object-language definitions of new predicates. But in mathematical theories, where object-language definitions typically occur, such definitions can always be restated as metalinguistic definitions of the form "Expression X will abbreviate expression Y." Thus mathematical definitions really constitute terminological stipulations, even when they are stated in the object language. But empirical bridge laws in scientific reductions are not mere stipulations; hence it is a mistake to classify them as definitions simply because they are biconditional in form and they meet the logician's criteria of non-creativity and eliminability.
In short, bridge laws cannot be classified as definitions in any ordinary sense. We can call them "extensional definitions" if we like; this label strongly suggests that they are not fundamental laws A number of philosophers have suggested that bridge laws reflect underlying attribute-identities.5 I.e., they claim that the predicates Pi and Q, in each bridge law B, express the same attribute. If this view is correct, then there is a clear sense in which bridge laws provide a reduction of T' to T alone-to wit, the ontology of T' is fully absorbed within the ontology of T. There remains the duality of theoretical predicates, of course, but this does not matter because all the attributes expressed by T'-predicates are already expressed by T-predicates alone.
I do not necessarily wish to deny that bridge laws reflect attributeidentities, or that the ontological unification achieved by attributeidentification is the basis for a complete reduction of T' to T alone. But I do wish to suggest an alternative way of explaining the non-fundamental status of bridge laws-a way which leaves open the question of attribute-identity, and which also leaves open the question whether attributes even exist.
This alternative account employs the concepts of possible-world semantics. Once we allow ourselves to talk about possible worlds, we have a rather natural way of expressing the idea that T' must be reduced to T alone: We can say that the bridge laws must obtain in all possible worlds in which T obtains. I.e., they must obtain in all T-accessible worlds, despite the fact that in interesting cases of reduction the bridge laws are logically independent of T. Borrowing a suggestive term from ethics, I shall call this feature supervenience. If the bridge laws are supervenient then T alone constitutes the ontological reduction-basis for T', even though the bridge laws are essential in establishing a logical connection between the two theories.
In ethics, the idea behind the concept of supervenience is that the evaluative features of persons, objects, and actions are determined by their "factual" or "descriptive" features. This determination supposedly does not rest on meta-ethical naturalism-the doctrine that evaluative concepts are definable in terms of factual concepts. Indeed, the major proponents of supervenience-G. E. Moore and R. M. Hare-explicitly reject naturalism. Hare explains supervenience by means of examples like the following: 4Hempel refers to bridge laws as "extensional definitions" in [7] . But he also emphatically stresses in [7] and [8] ; and yet (ii) I maintain that bridge laws are determined relative to the reducing theory T-in the sense that they are true in any possible world where T is true. How does this supervenience requirement relate to the view that bridge laws reflect attribute-identities? This of course depends on our approach to the individuation of attributes. According to one seemingly natural approach, two predicates express the same attribute only if they have the same intension-i. e., only if they are coextensive in all possible worlds. On this view, if the two predicates P, and Qi in a bridge law Bi express the same attribute, then Bi will hold in all possible worlds, and hence in all T-accessible worlds. Thus attribute-identity entails supervenience, under the given identitycondition for attributes.6 But supervenience does not entail attributeidentity, because the bridge laws could be true in all T-accessible worlds without being true in other possible worlds.
My project is to show that bridge laws in successful reductions actually are supervenient, as they should be if we are to claim with justification that they do not constitute fundamental laws in their own right. In the next two sections I lay the groundwork, with a preliminary discussion of the structure of reductions. The argument for supervenience is then presented in section 4. I conclude, in section 5, with some further remarks on attribute-identity. 6In the final section I briefly mention another approach to attribute-identity, also formulated in terms of the concepts of possible-world semantics. This alternative approach is compatible with, but evidently logically independent of, the supervenience of bridge laws.
2. Explanatory-Role Occupation, Theories, and Correspondence Principles. In the present section I point out an important feature of the frequently-discussed reduction of classical thermodynamics to molecular mechanics, a feature which clearly must be present in any adequate reduction. I then show that in order to guarantee this feature, we must impose a fourth formal condition on reduction, supplementary to the three basic conditions mentioned at the outset. In the course of the discussion it will be necessary to consider and compare several distinct views concerning the nature of scientific theories.
L. In the reduction of thermodynamics to molecular mechanics, gases are treated as mechanical systems: collections of molecules whose behavior is explainable by the laws of mechanics. The feature I wish to emphasize is that their behavior is fully explainable by these laws. In particular, the phenomena previously explained by reference to a gas's temperature are now explained instead by reference to its mean molecular kinetic energy, in virtue of the fundamental bridge law of the reduction-(2/3)E = KT, which expresses the correlation of mean kinetic energy with temperature. (K is a constant.) For instance, in cases where we formerly explained an increase in gas pressure by citing a prior increase in temperature together with the Boyle-Charles law PV = RT, we now explain the pressure increase by instead citing a prior increase in mean molecular kinetic energy, together with the law PV = (2/3)E. (The latter law, parallel in form to the Boyle-Charles law, follows from the laws of mechanics plus the reduction's specific statistical assumptions about the distribution and motions of gas molecules.7)
The concept of mean molecular kinetic energy thus occupies the full explanatory role possessed by the concept of temperature. And this coincidence of explanatory roles is vital to the success of the reduction. For suppose that our explanations required essential references to gas temperature over and above their references to mean kinetic energy. Then we would surely deny that thermodynamics had been fully reduced to molecular mechanics. We would say instead that temperature is a mysterious holistic feature of gases which prevents them from being purely mechanical systems, and that thermodynamics therefore defies reduction. The failure to achieve a satisfactory reduction would have resulted not from the absence of bridge laws, but from the fact that one bridge law introduces a nonmechanical concept that is essential in explaining the behavior of gases. In order to appreciate the import of explanatory-role occupation as just defined, one must distinguish two types of case: (i) cases where the explanandum E' of EXPJ contains no predicates from ST" and (ii) cases where E' does contain such predicates. In the former cases, the explanandum remains unchanged under the transformations that convert EXPj into B(EXPj). I.e., E' employs a vocabulary common to both T' and T, so that E' is the explanandum of B (EXPj) as well as EXPj. E' might be a statement concerning thermometerreadings, or pressure-gauge readings, or the like-a statement phrased in the "observational" vocabulary we use in giving empirical content to theories generally. Or E' might be a statement employing some theoretical notion common to both T' and T-for instance, the concept of pressure, which figures in the laws of both thermodynamics and molecular mechanics.
What about a T'-explanation whose explanandum E' does contain predicates from ST Sometimes philosophers of science conceive of a scientific theory as a set of laws. This conception is often at work in discussions of intertheoretic reduction; attention is usually focused on the logical derivation of the laws of T' from the laws of T and the bridge laws.9 But there is also a broader conception of theory abroad in philosophy of science-a conception which has both a traditional and a recent version. The traditional version, which Carl Hempel has labeled (in [6] ) the "standard conception" of scientific theories, is represented in the writings of such philosophers as Campbell, Ramsey, Carnap, Braithwaite, and Nagel. According to the standard conception, a scientific theory consists of two components: (1) an axiomatized deductive system of uninterpreted formulas, the axioms being the 8Berent Enc offers a different characterization of a "generative" relation between such event-pairs, in [4] . I myself have argued in [9] that there are really no such entities as events or states of affairs; accordingly, I prefer to regard generation as a relation between the statements E and E', since I contend that the putative entities e and e' do not exist. 9For instance, Robert Causey begins his [2], a paper on microreduction and attribute-identity, with the following sentence: "Suppose that we have two scientific theories, T, and T2, each of which is a set of reasonably well-confirmed laws." theory's laws; and (2) a set of statements that give cognitive content to this deductive system by interpreting some of its formulas in empirical terms. These latter statements are usually called "correspondence rules"; they have also been known as coordinating definitions, operational definitions, meaning postulates, or interpretative principles, and they have been characterized as forming a dictionary, or an interpretative system. Advocates of the standard conception have often employed a sharp dichotomy of vocabulary into "theoretical" and "observational" components, and they have conceived of the correspondence rules as statements containing vocabulary of both kinds.
The more recent version of the broad conception of scientific theories, on the other hand, is explicitly advocated by Hempel himself. any sharp distinction between theoretical vocabulary and observational vocabularly. Rather, bridge principles relate theoretical vocabulary to pre-theoretical vocabulary; the terms in the pre-theoretical vocabulary are understood antecedently to the formulation of the theory, but they need not be "purely observational." Second, he regards bridge principles not as definitions or rules of usage, but rather as substantive, factual, potentially-revisable assertions about the relation between the "theoretical scenario" and the empirical phenomena the theory is to explain.
I believe that Hempel's version of the broad conception of scientific theories is much superior to the standard conception, for the reasons he himself has set forth. Therefore I shall accept essentially his version as the proper formulation of the broad conception. But I shall also make two minor changes in his account, in the interests of maintaining clarity in the subsequent discussion. First, I shall refer to the statements in the second component as correspondence principles rather than bridge principles, so that these statements will not be confused with the bridge laws involved in intertheoretic reduction; this change in terminology also serves to remind the reader that correspondence principles are the analogs of the " correspondence rules" of the standard conception. Second, I hereby stipulate that statements specifying the descriptive models of the basic entities mentioned in the theory's laws-if there are such statements in the given theory-are to be classified among the theory's correspondence principles, rather than its internal principles. How we classify these model-specifying statements is somewhat arbitrary, since they have the dual function of (i) helping to characterize the theoretical scenario, and (ii) connecting theoretical concepts to pre-theoretical concepts. I place them with the correspondence principles so that the set of internal principles will consist only of the theory's laws, thus corresponding with the narrow conception of scientific theory.
So a theory T, in the broad sense of 'theory,' may be represented as the ordered couple of the set IT of internal principles (i.e., theoretical laws) and the set CT of correspondence principles: T = (IT, CT). (Alternatively, T may be regarded as the set c(IT U CT).) In the narrow sense of 'theory,' on the other hand, T is simply the set IT (or alternatively, c(IT)).
Since the notion of theory is ambiguous between these two senses, the notion of intertheoretic reduction is likewise ambiguous. When we speak of reducing T' to T, are we referring to IT This explanatory asymmetry is well illustrated by the diachronic aspects of the reduction of thermodynamics to molecular mechanics. Among the correspondence principles of thermodynamics are statements associating various degrees of temperature in gases with the appropriate readings on standard types of thermometers. These statements are dispositional in form; they assert that if a properly-working thermometer of a specified kind were placed in the presence of a gas with temperature t, then the thermometer would yield a numerical reading of t. When temperature is correlated with mean molecular kinetic energy in the course of the reduction, the B-translations of these correspondence principles are added to the class of correspondence principles of molecular mechanics. I.e., thermometers are assumed to be direct empirical indicators of various levels of mean kinetic energy. Now suppose one seeks to explain these associations between mean kinetic energy and thermometer-readings. As I noted early in section 2, gases are treated in the reduction as purely mechanical systems. Accordingly, the appropriate type of explanation here would be mechanical explanation: one would cite a causal chain beginning with a change of mean molecular kinetic energy in the gas, then leading (by virtue of the relevant laws") to certain micro-processes in the thermometer, and culminating in an observable macro-level change in the thermometer-this latter change being the cumulative result of the given micro-processes within the thermometer. This type of explanation requires no references to temperature, or to the correspondence principles linking temperature to thermometer-readings. On the contrary, these temperature/thermometer correspondence principles are themselves to be explained in terms of the new correspondence principles linking mean kinetic energy to thermometerreadings. Thus the latter principles possess a more fundamental explanatory status, even though the former possess a more fundamental epistemic status.
B (EXPj) is a correct T-explanation. Hence, by the definition of a T-explanation, B(CPk) belongs to C(IT U CT). Q.E.D. To establish that (4) is also a sufficient condition for explanatory-role occupation, we require another natural and plausible assumption concerning any two theories T and T' which satisfy the basic conditions (1)-(3). (II) For any correct T'-explanation EXPj, if every correspondence principle in B(EXPj) belongs to C(IT U CT), then B(EXPj) is a correct T-explanation.

Principle (II) is very hard to deny. After all, B(EXPj) is obtained from EXPj simply by replacing all ST'-predicates by their nomologically-coextensive B-correlates; these replacements are truth-preserving, and they render B(EXPj) isomorphic to EXPj. So surely B(EXPj) is a correct explanation, if EXPj itself is a correct explanation. And if every correspondence principle in B(EXPj) belongs to c(IT U CT), in accordance with the antecedent-clause of (II), then B(EXPj) is also a T-explanation, since every law occurring in B (EXPj) also belongs to C (IT U CT). (This latter fact is established as follows: by conditions (1) and (2) for reduction, the B-translation of any law of IT, belongs to C (IT); hence every law occurring in B(EXPj) belongs to C(IT), and thus to c(IT U CT).) Given principle (II), the argument to show that (4) is sufficient for explanatory-role occupation now proceeds as follows. Suppose that a reduction of theory T' to theory T satisfies conditions (1)-(4). By (4), every correspondence principle CPk in CTS such that B (CPk) belongs to C(IT U CT). So for any correct T'-explanation EXP;, all correspondence principles in B(EXPj) belong to c(IT U CT). Hence by (II), B(EXPj) is a correct T-explanation. Q.E.D. iv. I have argued thusfar that explanatory-role occupation is a prerequisite for complete and adequate reduction, and that explanatory-role occupation occurs if and only if condition (4) obtains in addition to conditions (I)-(3). These facts, in turn, lead us to two fundamental
So reduction as I have described it is typically a two-step process. The first step consists in showing that conditions (1)- (3) One of these problems concerns the meaning-determining aspects of the statements that link theoretical predicates to pre-theoretical predicates-the statements we have called "correspondence principles." In the standard conception of scientific theories, these statements are treated as analytically-true stipulative definitions, and they are taken to be the fundamental source of meaning for the otherwise uninterpreted axioms which supposedly comprise the theory's laws. In Hempel's revision of the standard conception, on the other hand, such statements are considered synthetic, by virtue of being factual, potentially revisable, and jointly falsifiable. But even granting that Hempel's account of theories is superior to the standard conception, still there seems to be an important element of truth in the earlier characterizations of correspondence principles as rules, or coordinating definitions, or meaning postulates. After all, correspondence principles give empirical content to theoretical concepts, by linking them to concepts describing observable phenomena; and despite the demise of logical positivism, surely this empirical content is an important component in the meaning of theoretical predicates. Furthermore, theoretical concepts are usually introduced in an effort to explain the pre-theoretical phenomena with which they are associated in the correspondence principles. Thus correspondence principles have a regulative status in theory-construction; they must continue to be held true for the most part, as scientists go about the business of refining and elaborating the theory, or else the theory will not successfully explain the pre-theoretical phenomena it was introduced to explain. In light of this regulative status, and in light of their role in conferring empirical content, it seems undeniable that correspondence principles collectively play a vital role in determining the very meaning of theoretical predicates, even though no individual correspondence principle is analytic or immune from revision.
A second familiar problem about the meaning of theoretical predicates concerns the extent to which these predicates are "theoryladen"-i.e., the extent to which their very meaning is determined by the theoretical laws in which they occur. Now although it is implausible to suggest that theoretical predicates are so theory-laden that the laws in which they occur are analytic, still there is surely an important element of truth in the notion of theory-ladenness. The meaning of a given theoretical concept is partly a function of its interrelationships with other theoretical concepts-the interrelationships expressed in theoretical laws. Thus laws, like correspondence principles, collectively contribute significantly to the very meaning of the theoretical predicates occurring in them, even though presumably no individual law is immune from revision.
So I take it to be a clear datum about the meaning of theoretical predicates-a datum based upon our pre-analytic, intuitive understanding of the notion of meaning-that correspondence principles and laws collectively play an extremely significant meaning-determining role with respect to theoretical predicates. It is well beyond the scope of the present paper to undertake the difficult task of developing a systematic theory of meaning that would explain this fact, and would also explain how collective meaning-determination can co-exist with the revisability and non-analyticity of the individual laws and correspondence principles. But the fact itself, and not an underlying theory of meaning to explain it, is all that shall be required for present purposes. The collective meaning-determining status of theoretical laws and correspondence principles will justify the key premise to be used in my argument for the supervenience of bridge laws.
As a prelude to a fully general formulation of the argument, let me first consider a specific example of reduction-once again, the familiar reduction of thermodynamics to molecular mechanics, with its familiar bridge law linking temperature to mean molecular kinetic energy. In the diachronics of the reduction, as we saw, the class of correspondence principles of molecular mechanics is expanded to include the B-translations of all the correspondence principles of thermodynamics. Thus in each T-world w, any particular level of mean molecular kine'tic energy will have all the observational characteristics that are paradigmatically associated with the corresponding degree of temperature: a given level of mean kinetic energy will have the same effect on any appropriately-constructed thermometer as it has in our actual world; a sufficiently high level of mean kinetic energy will have the same tendency to melt certain solids, etc. So if we were to adopt an extension-assignment A B for the temperaturepredicate which rendered this predicate coextensive-in-w with the predicate for mean kinetic energy, we would thereby guarantee that temperature is associated in w with all the appropriate observational features that are paradigmatic indicators of temperature according to the correspondence principles of thermodynamics. Furthermore, we would also guarantee that temperature is associated with all the appropriate theoretical features, because the laws of thermodynamics would all come out true-in-w under the envisioned extension-assignment A W. And surely there is no alternative extension-assignment which both (a) preserves all these laws and correspondence principles intact, and (b) is comparable in simplicity to A B.
Given these facts, it is difficult to see what more could reasonably be required as a basis for accepting A w as the correct extension-assignment for the temperature-predicate, relative to any T-world w. Indeed, it seems quite clear that one simply abuses the meaning of the concept of temperature if one denies, in the face of these facts, that temperature is coextensive in w with mean kinetic energy. And this is because the meaning of the temperature-predicate is largely determined by the collective laws and correspondence principles of thermodynamics, a fact which dictates that the correct extension-assignment for any T-world will be the simplest one that preserves these laws and correspondence principles intact. This line of reasoning will now be developed into a generalized argument for the supervenience of bridge laws. In order to facilitate the argument, let me introduce several preliminary definitions. 12A referee has expressed doubts concerning my reliance on the notion of simplicity in this argument. He remarks that he is unable to develop any clear intuitions about simplicity-comparisons among predicates, given the intuitive level at which I have discussed simplicity here. He also suggests that something like "explanatory potency," rather than simplicity, might be the feature which renders A' preferable to any rival extension-assignment A L. In reply, let me make two brief observations. First, if there were to arise an actual concrete case of reduction where several distinct sets of putative bridge laws each satisfied conditions (1)-(4), then in the context of these concrete alternatives a simplicity-comparison hopefully could be based upon some Let me now add two caveats. First, it must be admitted that many actual reductions do not really provide a derivation of T' from T U B. Rather it becomes evident in the course of reduction that the secondary theory T' is only approximately true. So the reduction actually provides a derivation of a corrected version of T', not the original version. But although this point is important to acknowledge, it does not affect the substance of the above discussion. Second, it must also be admitted that some instances of reduction are better viewed as replacements of one theory by another, rather than as deductive explanations. Our discussion does not apply directly to these cases, because they do not employ systematic intertheoretic bridge laws. Still, it is worth noting that even in "replacement reductions," there is a sense in which the full explanatory role of the predicates in the secondary theory T' is shown to be occupied by the predicates in the reducing theory T; thus it would seem reasonable to say that T' is just as respectable an incorrect theory in any T-world as it is (or was, prior to the reduction) in the actual world.
5. Identity, Necessity, and Attributes. The above argument for the supervenience of bridge laws is somewhat similar to Saul Kripke's well-known argument in [10] and [11] concerning the necessity of identity-statements. Kripke, appealing to the meaning-criteria which appear to be implicit in our use of names, claims that names are "rigid designators"-terms that designate the same individual in all possible worlds in which they designate at all; he concludes that true identity statements containing two names are true in all possible worlds. I claim, on the basis of the fact that the statements of IT' and CT' collectively play a vital meaning-determining role in regard to the ST -predicates, that the correct ST'-assignment for any T-world is the simplest one that preserves the truth of IT' and CT'; I conclude that the bridge laws B are true in all T-worlds.
Several views concerning attribute-identity are compatible with this approach to bridge laws. I shall briefly mention four alternatives, all of which possess some prima facie plausibility. (1) Bridge laws reflect attribute-identities. For every bridge law Bi there is a true identity statement 'p, = qi', where pi and q, are rigid attribute-designaspecific and precise context-relative criteria, despite the vagueness of the notion of simplicity at the abstract level. But secondly, suppose that the referee is correct in suggesting that there are standards other than simplicity which could render one potentially-permissible extension-assignment preferable to its rivals; as long as these standards continue to obtain in all T-worlds, my basic argument for supervenience can easily be modified to accommodate them. tors that correspond respectively to the predicates P, and Q,. (2) Bridge laws do not reflect attribute-identities, because there are possible worlds in which tLe secondary theory T' has a different reductive "realization" than it has in our actual world. Since Pi and Qi are not coextensive in such worlds, and since two predicates must be coextensive in all possible worlds in order to express the same attribute, the attributes expressed by Pi and Qi are distinct. Still, there is a generative relation between the two attributes, in that Qi is coextensive with P, in all T-worlds. (3) Bridge laws do reflect attribute-identities, despite the fact that there are possible worlds where T' has a different "realization" than it has in our actual world. This is because every theoretical predicate nonrigidly expresses, in any possible world w, the unique attribute which "realizes" that predicate in w. Thus for each bridge law Bi there is a contingently-true identity statement 'Pi = qi', where pi and q, are nonrigid attribute-designators that correspond respectively to the nonrigid predicates Pi and Qi ,3 (4) Bridge laws do not reflect attribute-identities, because there are no such entities as attributes. Scientific theories per se are not committed to their existence, and a sound ontology will repudiate them.
We cannot consider here the merits and weaknesses of these competing theses, but the following points deserve emphasis in conclusion. First, even if one is attracted by considerations of parsimony to the view that bridge laws reflect attribute-identities, one must still decide between two distinct identity theses: (1) and (3). Second, considerations of parsimony also support the thesis that there are no attributes at all, a view perhaps worthy of more attention than it has received in recent discussions of scientific reduction.
